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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL POWER TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY UsE OF IMPOSED CoNDITIONs TO INDUCE STATE CoNFORMlTY TO CoNGRESsIONAL POLICY - A federal grant of public land to the city of San Francisco,1
on condition that the land be used for municipal production and distribution- of
water and electricity, contained an express prohibition against the sale of electric
energy to any private company for resale. The United States sought to enjoin
the city from carrying out a contract with a private corporation whereby the
latter distributed the electricity to consumers at rates set by the state railroad
commission. The federal circuit court of appeals declared the relationship between the city and corporation was that of agency, rather than vendor and
vendee. On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, injunction should be granted as
the contract was a sale of electricity in violation of a valid condition in the
grant. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 60
S. Ct. 749 (1940), reversing City and County of San Francisco 'II. United
States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) 106 F. (2d) 569.
There are three ways in which the federal government may dispose of public
land: (1) sale or lease of the land, (2) use of the land in conjunction with
different governmental functions, or even to produce other property which, in
turn, is subject to disposition,2 (3) conveyance of the land on condition that the
grantee use it in a specified manner. 8 The primary interest of Congress in employing the first m·ethod is pecuniary. Through the second means Congress may

Raker Act of 1913, 38 Stat. L. 242 (1913).
The latter method is suggested in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U. S. 288 at 332, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936): "Upon what ground could it be said
that the government could not mine its own gold, silver, coal, lead, or phosphates in the
public domain, and dispose of them as property belonging to the United States?"
8 This is the method involved in the principal case.
1

2
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be able to engage in activities otherwise beyond its realm.' By utilizing the third
method when granting land to states, or subdivisions of states, Congress can
induce them to pursue Congressional policies. The significance of the latter
power depends upon the variety of the conditions that may be thus imposed.
The phrase "needful rules and regulations" in the Constitution 5 has not been
interpreted to restrict the imposition of conditions to those necessary for facilitating the alienation of the land. Nor is there any necessity that the main purpose
of the conditions be to improve the land, or bear some other close relation to
the fact that the subject matter is land.6 The object of conditions such as those
imposed upon land grants to states requiring that the land or its proceeds be
used for educational projects,1 or to build hospitals and jails,8 has nothing to do
with the land itself. According to the principal case, what Congress may require
the grantee to do or agree to do with the land as a condition precedent to
obtaining the property is practically boundless. In addition to the general statement that the federal power over public land is without limitation, the Court
expressly authorizes the use of conditions in land grants which require municipally owned and operated utilities to be maintained. 9 Since the variety of state
activity that may be induced by land grant conditions is unrestricted, the power
to dispose of property is quite similar to the power to dispose of money through
the spending clause.10 This raises the question whether the federal power over
public land presents Congress with opportunities for extending federal influence
which are beyond the scope of the spending power. Probably neither power
affords the basis for direct federal construction and operation of local electric
'The only possible constitutional basis for federal mmmg of coal or lead (see
2, supra) is the power to dispose of government property ( the land).
5 U. S. Const., art. 4, § 3: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States••••"
6 As is indicated, for example, by conditions of the homestead acts that the
grantee build upon and cultivate the land, 37 Stat. L. 123 (1912), 43 U. S. C.
(1934), § 164; that the grantee irrigate the land, 26 Stat. L. 1096, § 5 (1891),
43 U. S. C. (1934), § 328. Grants to states on condition that they irrigate the land,
28 Stat. L. 422, § 4 (1894), 43 U. S. C. (1934), § 641.
1 Morrill Acts, 12 Stat. L. 503 (1862), 7 U.S. C. (1934), § 305; 26 Stat. L.
417 (1890), 7 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 322, 323. The Morrill Acts were assumed
to be constitutional in Cornell University v. Fiske, 136 U. S. 152, IO S. Ct. 775
(1890), and Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Agricultural College v. Irvine, 206 U. S.
278, 27 S. Ct. 613 (1907).
8 36 Stat. L. 557 at 573, § 25 (1910).
9 "The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. • . • Thus, Congress may constitutionally limit the disposition of the public
domain to a manner consistent with its views of public policy. And the policy to
govern disposal of rights to develop hydroelectric power in such public lands may, if
Congress chooses, be one designed to avoid monopoly and to bring about a widespread distribution of benefits." Principal case, 310 U. S. 16 at 29-30.
10 U. S. Const., art. I, § 8. The powers are especially similar if use of the proceeds from sale of the land, as well as the land itself, may be conditioned.
note
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utilities.11 The ability of the federal government to grant money, instead of
land, to a state or city, on condition that the grantee operate a utility is subject
to the constitutional limitation that such expenditure be for the "general welfare." 12 No case has e}..-pressly stated that the imposition of conditions upon land
grants is subject to a corresponding limitation.18 The closest indication of such
a possibility is the judicial suggestion that the method of directly disposing of
electricity should be "adopted in the public interest." 14 It also has been suggested
on historical grounds that disposition of land should be for a "public purpose." 15
Even assuming that disposition of land must be for the "general welfare," the
limitation is hardly severe in view of the Supreme Court's tendency to permit
Congress to determine for itself what is for the "general welfare." 16 While
exercise of the spending power should not usurp rights reserved to the states,
any application of that limitation to land grant conditions voluntarily agreed to
by the states is briefly dismissed in the principal case.17 It is not altogether certain that the conditions of the land grant to San Francisco require activity by the
city which the federal government cannot undertake directly. By an affirmative
answer to a question left untouched in .llshwander v. Tennessee Valley .llutliority,18 the government would be able to distribute electricity to consumers. The
language of the principal case,19 however, is broad enough to enable Congress
11 The federal right to generate electricity (building the dam, etc., not distributing the electricity) is based on the commerce or war power instead of being
upheld as a means of disposing of government land particularly suited to such use,
or as a proper exercise of the spending power. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936).
12
It can be argued that if Congress cannot do a thing itself through the spending
power or power to dispose of property, it cannot bring it about indirectly by granting
money or land to the states on condition that they carry out the project. In the latter
method, however, the government is not engaging directly in a new .field; to permit it
to do so solely on the basis of the spending power, or power to dispose of property,
would break down practically all constitutional limitations.
18
Grants of land to states for local educational purposes (see note 7, supra) probably would be upheld today as being for the "general welfare," but it is doubtful if
they would have been so regarded at the time the grants were made. Thus it might
be argued that there is no such limitation on the power to impose conditions upon
the disposition of property.
14
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 at 338, 56 S. Ct.
466 (1936).
15
Burdick, "Federal Aid Legislation," 8 CoRN. L. Q. 324 (1923).
16
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 at 640, 57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).
11 "The statutory requirement that . . . power be publicly distributed does not
represent an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State but instead only
an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property
entrusted to it." Principal case, 3 IO U. S. 16 at 30.
18
297 U. S. 288 at 340, 56 S. Ct. 466 ( I 936): "the constitutional right of the
Government to acquire or operate local or urban distribution systems is not involved."
That the government could generate the power which is distributed necessitates the
assumption that the source of the water power is a. navigable stream. It is not clear
from the facts of the principal case whether a navigable stream is involved.
19
See note 9, supra.
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to grant land to states on condition that they build and operate factories in
competition with private industry. That the federal government could conduct
such factories 20 itself is much more doubtful. Whether similar state action could
be purchased by grants of money is debatable.21 By such a liberal interpretation,
Article 4, section 3 of the Constitution provides Congress with a potent method
for inducing states to accomplish that which Congress cannot do directly, and
possibly even that which the states cannot be induced to perform through use
of the federal spending power.

20 I.e., factories producing for the public which cannot be justified on the war
power or some other federal power. However, if the federal government should engage
directly in such activity, and assuming that it would be unconstitutional, there is the
practical problem of how the question would get before the courts. Neither the taxpayers nor the companies with which the government would compete could raise
the question. If the government resorted to eminent domain to acquire land, the defendant in the eminent domain proceeding probably could raise the question. Where
money or land is granted to states on condition, the question would arise if the states
attempted to retain the benefits of the grants without performing the conditions.
21 It would be subject to the "general welfare" limitation. State operation of
utilities, induced by the federal government, might be considered for the "general
welfare" while state participation in private industry might not be so regarded. Also,
the federal power to spend money has not been stated in as inclusive terms as has the
power over public land (see note 9, supra).

